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Gun rights are celebrated by many as a form of liberty-"America's
First Freedom," as the title of the NRA magazine puts it.' But what kind
of liberty is at stake, and for whom? Ian Ayres and Fredrick Vars' Weapon
of Choice provides a novel and important approach to those questions by
proposing a system by which people can voluntarily restrict their own
access to arms.2 The lessons it suggests are relevant to discussions of gun
rights and regulation more broadly; namely, that gun rights can be
understood as both positive and negative liberties (to borrow Isaiah
Berlin's famous frame from "Two Concepts of Liberty" 3), and that efforts
to regulate guns can also be understood in those terms.
Putting liberty on both sides of the scale is important. The gun debate
in the United States is usually framed as if it is a matter of constitutional
liberty on one side-that of gun owners-and "policy" interests on the
other. As a matter of litigation, this is not necessarily a losing frame for
would-be regulators, since constitutional rights can sometimes be
restricted if the government can show that the regulation in question is
adequately tailored to achieving a sufficiently weighty governmental
purpose. 4 And, since no one doubts the importance of the governmental
purpose in lessening the catastrophic number of fatal gun injuries (about
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40,000 in 20185), the question typically becomes whether any particular
law does so effectively enough. In the vast majority of litigated Second
Amendment cases, the answer has been "yes."6
But the "liberty versus policy" frame nonetheless distorts
constitutional litigation and public discourse, effectively stacking the
deck-legally and rhetorically-against efforts to reduce gun harms.
After the 2014 Isla Vista massacre led to calls for gun regulation,
commentator Joe "the Plumber" Wurzelbacher said to the parents of the
gunshot victims: "your dead kids don't trump my constitutional rights." 7
A Washington Post op-ed, while not endorsing Wurzelbacher's tone,
concluded that he "has a point." 8 The exchange illustrates the trap of the
liberty-versus-policy frame: Solid evidence can and should be sufficient
to sustain many gun laws, but if even "dead kids" don't count against the
"trump" of the right to keep and bear arms, then would-be regulators are
up against a wall.
It is notable, then, that litigators, scholars, and others have recently
begun to emphasize the degree to which liberty interests are on all sides
of the gun debate-including with regard to such foundational interests as
personal safety.' As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent in
McDonald v. City of Chicago, "[y]our interest in keeping and bearing a
certain firearm may diminish my interest in being and feeling safe from
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armed violence." 10 In this frame, it is impossible to play "liberty" as a
trump card. What is at stake are two competing visions of liberty."
Weapon of Choice both builds on and complicates this story about
liberty and guns. Others at this symposium were better equipped to
address the proposal's likely effectiveness as a matter of policy. I have
written elsewhere about some of the constitutional questions involved,
including the right not to keep or bear arms.1 2 Here, I try to unpack some
of its implications for liberty and choice-an issue that, no less than the
policy or constitutional implications, is at the heart of the proposal.
In "Two Concepts of Liberty," Berlin (drawing on deeper currents in
debates about liberalism) laid out two different ways of thinking about
liberty, which he called negative and positive. 13 Roughly, negative liberty
is "freedom from"-an absence of interference from others, including,
most crucially, the state.14 Positive liberty, by contrast, is a "freedom
to"-to realize one's goals and purposes.' 5 As Frank Michelman
summarizes: "Negative liberty refers to absence of restraint against doing
as one wants, while positive liberty implies action governed by reasons or
laws that one gives to oneself." 16
American rights talk tends to be associated with the former frame,
since our constitution (the federal one, anyway17 ) is typically understood
to limit governmental interference with individual choice, rather than to
guarantee meaningful choices. From Berlin's perspective, this is all for
the best, since a system of positive liberties can enable and even encourage
governmental overreach by legitimizing imposition of values and choices

10 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 891 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See Jamal Greene, Foreword: Rights As Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 30, 34
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"paradigmatic conflicts of a modern, pluralistic political order" in part because it "cannot
accommodate conflicts of rights"); see also Joseph Blocher, Rights as Trumps of What?, 132
HARV. L. REV. F. 120, 120-22 (2019).
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thought to be in people's "true" interests. Berlin's views in this regard
were shaped by the historical tendency of oppressive governments to
justify their actions in those terms, not that this is always or necessarily
so. 18 Others have responded that the negative liberty Berlin celebrates is
hardly valuable if it does not include a liberty to exercise meaningful
choices. 19
How does Berlin's frame map onto the debate about gun rights and
regulation, and the liberty frames discussed above? What kind of libertypositive or negative-do gun rights advocates seek? What about gun
regulators? And where does Weapon of Choice fit in?
In the traditional liberty-versus-policy frame, opponents of gun
regulation are cast as asserting a negative liberty to be free from
government restrictions on their use of firearms. This is the classic
formulation of an American constitutional rights claim and is easily
framed as a basic libertarian argument about choice. The complicating
factor, of course, is that many believe that the choice is not selfregarding-hence Justice Stevens' argument above 20-so it does not lend
itself to such a claim. Some less prominent gun rights claims involve a
positive liberty argument and enlist state intervention to override the
choices of other private actors who wish to limit exposure to guns. Such
interventions are evident, for example, in what are sometimes called "take
your gun to work" laws, which limit the ability of private businesses to
exclude guns from their premises.2 1
Would-be regulators, by contrast, typically assert something like a
positive liberty-a claim for state intervention, including the imposition
of external obstacles (i.e., regulation) on others' conduct.22 But here again,
the distinction is not quite so clear once one considers the kinds of
constitutional interests and liberties described above. Advocates of gun
regulation are also asserting a freedomfrom the "external constraint" of a
bullet (or, for that matter, coercion or intimidation), a standard negative
liberty claim. In the words of a grieving parent who lost a child in the 2014
Santa Barbara shooting: "They talk about gun rights. What about Chris's

1 Daniel M. Weinstock, Berlin's Methodological Parsimony, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
839, 843 (2009).
19 Charles Taylor, What's Wrong with Negative Liberty, in 2 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS:
PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 211, 217-19 (1985); see also AMARTYA SEN,
DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 18 (1999) (describing a "capabilitics" approach to defining
freedom).
20 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 891 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21
Blocher, supra note 12, at 41-42.
22 See Carter, supra note 15.

TWO CONCEPTS OF GUN

2021]

LIBERTY

367

right to live?"23 Notably, it was this comment that inspired Joe the
Plumber's retort;2 4 a perfect encapsulation of the competing/co-existing
rights claims.
As a matter of constitutional doctrine, one might suggest that the
state action requirement draws a clear line-gun owners are asserting a
right to be free from governmental interference, while would-be
regulators are making claims against other private citizens who generally
are not obligated to respect anyone else's constitutional rights. Though
true, even as a matter of straightforward doctrine, it is clear that
constitutional rights can be regulated in the name of protecting other
constitutional interests.25 So the question is not necessarily whether
freedom from gun violence is an enforceable constitutional right; rather,
the question is whether freedom from gun violence is a legitimate basis
for legislation. The answer is plainly yes.
More fundamentally, threats to negative liberty can and often do
come from private sources. A woman who is terrorized by an armed
domestic abuser is decidedly unfree; she is constrained in her choices (a
violation of negative liberty), notwithstanding the lack of direct
government involvement. 26 Indeed, the very logic of the right to keep and
bear arms is, most commonly, a right to arm oneself against such threats.
Whereas regulators seek safety from private threats through law, most gun
owners seek to do so by arming themselves. 27 Although the means are
different, the liberty they are defending is the same.
In short, the gun debate does not, as it might first appear, map neatly
onto Berlin's frames of negative and positive liberty. And, understanding
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those frames and how they are deployed is crucial to understand the
broader debate about gun rights and regulation. The question must be how
to accommodate a multiplicity of constitutional interests, not whether to
limit one right-the Second Amendment-in the name of policy
considerations.
Weapon of Choice-particularly, the first third of the book, which is
dedicated to the issue of self-restriction-both illustrates and complicates
this story of liberty and gun violence. As the title suggests, choice is the
essential and distinguishing feature of Donna's Law, the proposal at the
center of the book.28 It is therefore especially important to unpack the
nature of the liberty that Ayres and Vars have in mind. Partly, as the book
explains persuasively, and in some detail, this means understanding selfrestriction as choice-Ulysses tying himself to the mast, to borrow a
metaphor.29
What does Donna's Law look like through the lens of Berlin's two
frames? Is it an instance of positive or of negative liberty? And,
conversely, what does self-restriction have to show about Berlin's seminal
distinction? Can the broad and longstanding debate about positive and
negative liberties benefit from closer consideration of self-restrictions like
Donna's Law?
Interestingly, both Berlin and Ayres/Vars effectively build their
ideas around the notion of a "divided self." 30 Consider, for example, a
person who is in the grips of mental illness, and whose freedom from
restraint (i.e., negative liberty) could lead not only to self-harm but to
destruction of his own freedom to define himself over time. Is it libertyenhancing to reject or remove restraints-even those that are selfselected-in such a situation? For Ayres and Vars, this is of course the
heart of their proposal: To permit those who fear such a moment to guard
themselves against it by restricting their own access to arms. 31 If one
conceptualizes mental illness as an "external" constraint, then selfrestriction in response is essentially self-defense: a classic claim of
negative liberty. 32
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AYRES & VARS, supra note 2, at 3.
Angela Selvaggio & Fredrick E. Vars, "Bind Me More Tightly Still": Voluntary
Restraint Against Gun Suicide, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 671, 672 (2016) (employing the
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30 Berlin, supranote 3, at 181.
31 See AYRES & VARS, supra, note 2, at 3.
32 See Carter, supra note 15 ("[N]egative theorists tend to count only external obstacles
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Conversely, self-restriction is a quintessential act of positive liberty:
"the possibility of acting - or the fact of acting - in such a way as to take
33
control of one's life and realize one's fundamental purposes," even if
that means accepting or seeking temporary restraints. This is liberty, but
of a different kind. As Berlin noted,
The desire to be governed by myself, or at any rate to participate in the process

by which my life is to be controlled, may be as deep a wish as that for a free area
for action, and perhaps historically older. But it is not a desire for the same
34
thing.

For Berlin, by way of partial contrast, the notion of the divided self
provides not only the basis of a conception of positive liberty, but also a
cautionary note about how such liberty can be invoked to justify the
imposition of freedom-sapping restraints.35 Recognizing a divided selfa higher, rational self, and a lower, unreflective and sometimes selfdestructive self-sets up the notion that a person is "free" when the former
is in control. Perhaps that is easy to accept in the case of severe mental
illness. But what about a person who is impulsive or sad? For Berlin, the
main concern was that if one scales up to the collective or social level,
then it becomes easier to justify oppression in the name of freedom:
repression will be imposed "in the name, and on behalf, of their 'real'
selves, in the secure knowledge that whatever is the true goal of man ...
must be identical with his freedom." 36 Ayres and Vars seem sensitive to
this kind of slippery slope, which might explain why their proposal places
limits on the ways in which the registry can be used-forbidding, for
example, certain parties from requesting or requiring information about
registration.
Framing a gun policy in this way-as enhancing liberty (whether
understood in negative or positive terms)-is itself an important
contribution that has implications beyond the specifics of Donna's Law.
To make the discussion concrete, consider a legal hypothetical: Could an
individual who has been battling depression or some other mental health
challenge seek an extreme risk protection order (i.e., an ERPO or red flag)
"against" themselves? Doing so would mean convincing a court to issue

33

Id. (describing positive liberty).
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Berlin, supra note 3, at 178.
See id.
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36 Id. at 180; see also id. at 181 ("[T]he 'positive' conception of freedom as self-mastery.
has in fact, and as a matter of history, of doctrine and of practice, lent itself more easily to
this splitting of personality into two[] .... ").
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an order on the basis that-in the words of Connecticut's pathbreaking
1999 risk warrant statute 37 - the person presented "probable cause to
believe .. . [the] person poses a risk of imminent personal injury to
himself or herself or to other individuals." 38 ERPO laws typically say that
petitions can be filed by law enforcement officers or family members, so
it is not totally clear whether a person could legally seek one on their own.
That person, however, could simply ask a family member or law
enforcement officer to file the petition; many ERPOs are uncontested
anyway, and those predicated on risks of self-harm probably involve, in
some instances, the equivalent of a cry for help.
It is unclear whether such self-referred ERPOs are prevalent, but they
would emphatically not be a substitute. Donna's Law is designed for
people to opt-out of gun purchases or possession when they are not in the
midst of a crisis, and that class of persons would not necessarily satisfy
the "imminence" requirement for an ERPO. And those who do pose an
imminent risk to themselves or others are likely not in a position to go
through the registration process that Donna's Law sets up. The point is
simply that the law may already provide a way for people to choose.
What changes if the Donna's Law/ERPO scenario is "scaled up" to
include more than one person? A household? A homeowner's association,
by way of a covenant? A neighborhood, city, or state? Ayres and Vars
address some of these associational settings in later parts of the book, and
in other work. 39 The larger the group, the harder the questions-a polity
will inevitably be even more divided than a single "divided" self. But the
lesson of Weapon of Choice is that liberty is on all sides of those questions.
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